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TAGS: [PARM](#) [MTCRE](#) [PREL](#) [IR](#) [AE](#) [KN](#)

SUBJECT: AUGUST 2008 VISIT TO NORTH KOREA BY A UAE  
DELEGATION FOR MEETINGS WITH KOMID (S)

REF: A. 00 STATE 068398  
[B.](#) STATE 081224  
[C.](#) ABU DHABI 000865  
[D.](#) STATE 032956  
[E.](#) ABU DHABI 000448  
[F.](#) STATE 080523  
[G.](#) ABU DHABI 000867

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM  
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (C) AND (D).

[1.](#) (U) This is an action request. Embassy Abu Dhabi, please see paragraph 5.

[2.](#) (S) Background/Objective: In July 2008, the U.S. raised with the UAE information indicating that North Korea's primary weapons trading firm, the Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), was working to acquire a visa so that its representative could travel to the UAE (Ref B). Because this individual had been associated with North Korea's assistance to Iran's missile program and in light of past missile-related cooperation between the UAE and North Korea, we requested UAE officials provide us with details regarding the purpose of this representative's visit to the UAE. As of November 2008, we have not received a substantive response from the UAE to this demarche. Since our July discussions, we have learned that a delegation from the UAE traveled to North Korea in August 2008 for meetings with KOMID. As was the case with the planned travel of the KOMID representative to the UAE in June 2008, we are concerned that this UAE delegation's travel to North Korea potentially could be related to missile cooperation. We therefore want to raise this activity with UAE officials and request they share with us any available information on the purpose of these contacts with North Korea.

[3.](#) (S) Additional Background/For Post Only: The 1999 transfer of Missile Technology Control Regime Category I Scud ballistic missiles and related equipment from North Korea to the UAE triggered a review under the U.S. missile sanctions laws. As a result of this review, the USG determined on April 6, 2000 that sanctionable activity took place requiring the imposition of sanctions on North Korea's Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (now known as KOMID) and the UAE's Armed Forces General Headquarters. However, the USG further decided, as permitted under the law, that it was essential to the national security of the United States to waive these sanctions against the UAE entity. The decision to waive sanctions was made based on assurances provided to the USG by then UAE Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Mohammed bin Zayid (MBZ) on behalf of the UAE government (UAEG). Specifically, MBZ affirmed the U.S. understanding that the UAE missile force consists of fewer than 30 missiles, roughly half Scud C and half Scud B, and that the UAEG is committed to: a) not acquire any additional ballistic missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km; b) not upgrade the range/payload capability of the missiles the UAE currently possesses; c) not possess unconventional warheads or weapons of mass destruction; and d) not conclude any new missile technology or arms deals with North Korea (Ref A).

[4.](#) (S) In a separate matter, we would like to follow-up with

UAE authorities concerning information we raised in April 2008 indicating that the UAE-based aerospace firm Noor Aerospace Technologies was working to supply Iran's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program with several types of jet engines controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) (Refs D and E). We also want to follow-up with the UAEG on a case we discussed in July 2008 concerning efforts by the UAE firm Golden Triangle Testing Equipment to procure fifty export-controlled Swiss-origin machine tools on behalf of an Iranian end-user (Refs F and G). We want to request an update from UAE officials on the status of their investigations in both of these cases and ask for any available details on actions taken by the UAEG in response to the information provided by the U.S.

15. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Abu Dhabi approach appropriate UAE authorities to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 6 below and report response. Talking points may be provided as a non-paper.

16. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL UNITED ARAB EMIRATES)

Korean Mining Development Corporation

-- We would like to raise with you a matter of proliferation concern involving your government and North Korea.

-- You will recall that in July 2008, we shared with you information indicating that North Korea's primary weapons trading firm, the Korean Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), was working to acquire a visa so that its representative could travel to the UAE.

-- Our information indicated that the individual seeking this visa had been associated with KOMID's assistance to Iran's missile program and we are concerned that he was traveling to the UAE to promote missile-related cooperation between KOMID and your government.

-- Although we requested you provide us details concerning the purpose of this visit, we have yet to receive a response from your government on this issue.

-- Since our July 2008 discussions, we have learned that a delegation from the UAE traveled to North Korea from August 16-20 for meetings with KOMID.

-- As was the case with the KOMID representative's visit to the UAE, we are concerned that this activity may be related to missile cooperation that would be inconsistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 and would appreciate learning more about the purpose of this delegation's visit to North Korea.

Noor Aerospace Technologies

-- In April 2008, we raised with you our concerns that the UAE-based aerospace firm Noor Aerospace Technologies was working to supply the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA) with several types of jet engines and that HESA plans to use these engines in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) applications.

-- We understood that Noor Aerospace Technologies intended to falsify export licensing documents identifying these engines and their ultimate destination to facilitate their transfer to Iran.

-- We believe the jet engines to be supplied by Noor Aerospace Technologies are controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and are prohibited from being transferred to Iran under UNSCR 1737.

Golden Triangle

-- In July 2008, we advised that the UAE firm Golden Triangle

Testing Equipment L.L.C. had expressed interest in procuring fifty Swiss-origin machine tools on behalf of an Iranian end-user.

-- The machines sought by Golden Triangle Testing Equipment are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Wassenaar Arrangement and are well-suited to manufacturing ballistic missile components such as impellers and turbine blades.

-- In both these cases, we asked that you investigate this activity and take measures to prevent unauthorized transfers to Iran that would be inconsistent with UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803.

-- We would appreciate an update on your inquiries into these three cases at the earliest possible time.

-- We look forward to continuing cooperation on this and other nonproliferation matters.

End talking points/non-paper

17. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone: 202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR.

18. (U) A word version file of this document will be posted at [www.state.sgov.gov/demarche](http://www.state.sgov.gov/demarche).  
RICE

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End Cable Text